New top story on Hacker News: Show HN: Deon.land – Deno.land?
Show HN: Deon.land – Deno.land?
22 by hobofan | 12 comments on Hacker News.
After yesterday's release of Deno with package.json support[0] some discussions about how Deno handles dependencies have been coming up again. Since Deno's inception, I've mostly been watching it from the sidelines, dabbling a bit with it, and mostly been considering it a fad that will die out sooner or later. Ultimately, with the new package.json support nothing really changed regarding the dependency management story of Deno. It's still as awful as ever. Prompted by some discussions, I decided I would try to test how easy it would be to mount a typo-domain supply chain attack. And as expected, it's about as easy as buying a domain and setting up a Cloudflare Worker (which isn't any harder than setting up Deno Deploy). And voila, for importing your favorite dependency, just copy-past the following snippet into your code (which after all is how you include dependencies in Deno): ``` import * as flat from "https://ift.tt/Os7kiGu"; ``` Which is virtually indistinguishable from what you'll find here[1]: ``` import * as flat from "https://ift.tt/ENlCnsK"; ``` (I swear, nothing bad will happen!) ------- Typo supply-chain attack aren't anything new. They are probably the most popular attack type on package managers (and their registries) in the past few years. This one is just slightly different because it is even worse, because unlike a moderated[2] registry like npmjs.com, this can't be easily taken down to reduce the exposure of developers to it. While this is just a fun little gag, the Deno teams stance on security is not so funny. While Deno has a few minimal security options nowadays, such as subresource integrity for a deno.json, you have to actively seek them out, and most project's don't even use a deno.json. Deno is creating a ecosystem with bad security defaults (with a community rejecting efforts towards them), to have a "simpler" system. They prioritize onboarding new developers over the security needs of the users of the services that those developers will build. I don't think that's okay. So, go ahead and have fun: Replace deno.land with deon.land in every import you want. Deno won't stop you! :) [0]: https://ift.tt/8CixHzs [1]: https://ift.tt/ENlCnsK [2]: https://ift.tt/vUSoHpA
February 25, 2023 at 10:26PM hobofan 22 https://ift.tt/X0tjDOP Show HN: Deon.land – Deno.land? 12 After yesterday's release of Deno with package.json support[0] some discussions about how Deno handles dependencies have been coming up again. Since Deno's inception, I've mostly been watching it from the sidelines, dabbling a bit with it, and mostly been considering it a fad that will die out sooner or later. Ultimately, with the new package.json support nothing really changed regarding the dependency management story of Deno. It's still as awful as ever. Prompted by some discussions, I decided I would try to test how easy it would be to mount a typo-domain supply chain attack. And as expected, it's about as easy as buying a domain and setting up a Cloudflare Worker (which isn't any harder than setting up Deno Deploy). And voila, for importing your favorite dependency, just copy-past the following snippet into your code (which after all is how you include dependencies in Deno): ``` import * as flat from "https://ift.tt/Os7kiGu"; ``` Which is virtually indistinguishable from what you'll find here[1]: ``` import * as flat from "https://ift.tt/ENlCnsK"; ``` (I swear, nothing bad will happen!) ------- Typo supply-chain attack aren't anything new. They are probably the most popular attack type on package managers (and their registries) in the past few years. This one is just slightly different because it is even worse, because unlike a moderated[2] registry like npmjs.com, this can't be easily taken down to reduce the exposure of developers to it. While this is just a fun little gag, the Deno teams stance on security is not so funny. While Deno has a few minimal security options nowadays, such as subresource integrity for a deno.json, you have to actively seek them out, and most project's don't even use a deno.json. Deno is creating a ecosystem with bad security defaults (with a community rejecting efforts towards them), to have a "simpler" system. They prioritize onboarding new developers over the security needs of the users of the services that those developers will build. I don't think that's okay. So, go ahead and have fun: Replace deno.land with deon.land in every import you want. Deno won't stop you! :) [0]: https://ift.tt/8CixHzs [1]: https://ift.tt/ENlCnsK [2]: https://ift.tt/vUSoHpA
22 by hobofan | 12 comments on Hacker News.
After yesterday's release of Deno with package.json support[0] some discussions about how Deno handles dependencies have been coming up again. Since Deno's inception, I've mostly been watching it from the sidelines, dabbling a bit with it, and mostly been considering it a fad that will die out sooner or later. Ultimately, with the new package.json support nothing really changed regarding the dependency management story of Deno. It's still as awful as ever. Prompted by some discussions, I decided I would try to test how easy it would be to mount a typo-domain supply chain attack. And as expected, it's about as easy as buying a domain and setting up a Cloudflare Worker (which isn't any harder than setting up Deno Deploy). And voila, for importing your favorite dependency, just copy-past the following snippet into your code (which after all is how you include dependencies in Deno): ``` import * as flat from "https://ift.tt/Os7kiGu"; ``` Which is virtually indistinguishable from what you'll find here[1]: ``` import * as flat from "https://ift.tt/ENlCnsK"; ``` (I swear, nothing bad will happen!) ------- Typo supply-chain attack aren't anything new. They are probably the most popular attack type on package managers (and their registries) in the past few years. This one is just slightly different because it is even worse, because unlike a moderated[2] registry like npmjs.com, this can't be easily taken down to reduce the exposure of developers to it. While this is just a fun little gag, the Deno teams stance on security is not so funny. While Deno has a few minimal security options nowadays, such as subresource integrity for a deno.json, you have to actively seek them out, and most project's don't even use a deno.json. Deno is creating a ecosystem with bad security defaults (with a community rejecting efforts towards them), to have a "simpler" system. They prioritize onboarding new developers over the security needs of the users of the services that those developers will build. I don't think that's okay. So, go ahead and have fun: Replace deno.land with deon.land in every import you want. Deno won't stop you! :) [0]: https://ift.tt/8CixHzs [1]: https://ift.tt/ENlCnsK [2]: https://ift.tt/vUSoHpA
February 25, 2023 at 10:26PM hobofan 22 https://ift.tt/X0tjDOP Show HN: Deon.land – Deno.land? 12 After yesterday's release of Deno with package.json support[0] some discussions about how Deno handles dependencies have been coming up again. Since Deno's inception, I've mostly been watching it from the sidelines, dabbling a bit with it, and mostly been considering it a fad that will die out sooner or later. Ultimately, with the new package.json support nothing really changed regarding the dependency management story of Deno. It's still as awful as ever. Prompted by some discussions, I decided I would try to test how easy it would be to mount a typo-domain supply chain attack. And as expected, it's about as easy as buying a domain and setting up a Cloudflare Worker (which isn't any harder than setting up Deno Deploy). And voila, for importing your favorite dependency, just copy-past the following snippet into your code (which after all is how you include dependencies in Deno): ``` import * as flat from "https://ift.tt/Os7kiGu"; ``` Which is virtually indistinguishable from what you'll find here[1]: ``` import * as flat from "https://ift.tt/ENlCnsK"; ``` (I swear, nothing bad will happen!) ------- Typo supply-chain attack aren't anything new. They are probably the most popular attack type on package managers (and their registries) in the past few years. This one is just slightly different because it is even worse, because unlike a moderated[2] registry like npmjs.com, this can't be easily taken down to reduce the exposure of developers to it. While this is just a fun little gag, the Deno teams stance on security is not so funny. While Deno has a few minimal security options nowadays, such as subresource integrity for a deno.json, you have to actively seek them out, and most project's don't even use a deno.json. Deno is creating a ecosystem with bad security defaults (with a community rejecting efforts towards them), to have a "simpler" system. They prioritize onboarding new developers over the security needs of the users of the services that those developers will build. I don't think that's okay. So, go ahead and have fun: Replace deno.land with deon.land in every import you want. Deno won't stop you! :) [0]: https://ift.tt/8CixHzs [1]: https://ift.tt/ENlCnsK [2]: https://ift.tt/vUSoHpA
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